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Abstract
We examine optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with unemployment and financial
frictions where banks produce loans using equity as collateral. Firms and households demand loans to
finance externally a fraction of their flows of expenditures. Our findings show amplifying business-cycle
effects of a more rigid loan production technology. In the monetary policy analysis, the optimal rule
clearly outperforms Taylor (1993) rule. The optimized interest-rate response to the external finance
premium turns significantly negative when either banking rigidities are high or when financial shocks
are the only source of business cycle fluctuations.
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1 Introduction
Macroeconomic models commonly introduce financial frictions by describing agency problems. The seminal
contribution to this literature is Townsend (1979), who defines a competitive equilibrium with external fi-
nance under asymmetric information and costly state verification. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) develop the
financial accelerator mechanism in Townsend (1979)’s framework with overlapping generations: economic
expansions increase net worth and reduce auditing costs, which explains amplifying effects on investment.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) describe the role of entrepreneurs with random returns in a business cycle
model. After observing technology or financial shocks, entrepreneurs borrow from lenders at an interest
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rate that depends inversely on their net worth and positively on the agency costs. Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) introduce a two-sector model where capital serves as both collateral for borrowing and input for
production. The financial friction is then characterized through a collateral constraint that determines the
cost of borrowing depending upon the market value of capital.
The interactions between price rigidities and financial frictions were first examined by Bernanke et
al. (1999), who show the quantitative implications for the financial accelerator mechanism under sticky
prices. A vast literature followed this New Keynesian approach for both business cycles and monetary
policy analysis. Faia and Monacelli (2007) examine monetary policy in a model with financial frictions
and nominal rigidities. Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) introduce a liquidity (transaction) constraint on
consumption spending, and a loan production technology where loans are produced combining monitoring
labor and collateralizing assets (capital and bonds). Christiano et al. (2008) extend a DSGE-style model
with banking and financial frictions and estimate it for both the US and the Euro Area. The stock of
capital, labor and excess reserves are inputs for the production of loans. In addition, firms face a liquidity
constraint and must borrow a fraction of their wage and capital rental bills from banks. Cúrdia and
Woodford (2010) have two types of household preferences that result in having financial flows running
from savers to borrowers. They study unconventional monetary policy rules which may expand central
bank credit to offset a disruption of financial intermediation. Gertler and Karadi (2011) assume a moral
hazard problem between the bank and the households that makes the balance sheet status of the bank
determine the amount of deposits they can get from the households. Angeloni and Faia (2013) build a
model with bank runs and describe the way macro-prudential policy can be designed to prevent the economy
from falling into a bank crisis. Carlstrom et al. (2014) show that contract indexation improves the fit of
the estimated model to actual data and increases the role of investment shocks to explain business cycle
fluctuations. Christiano et al. (2014) find that risk shocks (time-varying dispersion in the idiosyncratic
shock to the return of investment projects for entrepreneurs) play a major role in the financial accelerator
mechanism. Finally, Villa (2016) estimates both the Bernanke et al. (1999) and the Gertler and Karadi
(2011) models and finds that the latter provides a better fit to business cycle data of both the US and the
Euro Area during the Great Moderation period.
In the flexible-price line of research, Wasmer and Weil (2004) study the interplay between credit and
labor market imperfections in a model with matching frictions, and Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2011)
show that a calibrated model with matching frictions in labor, goods and credit markets does a better job
than standard search models at replicating the persistence and volatility of unemployment fluctuations.
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) find non-linearities and asymmetries on the responses to shocks in a
financial economics model with heterogeneous agents and liquidity constraints. They describe the volatility
paradox as the persistent endogenous risk, which emerges from the asset illiquidity observed in crisis, even
for very low levels of exogenous risk. This phenomenon recommends the use of macro-prudential regulation
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to prevent the economy from the instability obtained when variables jump out of the steady state.1
Our paper examines monetary policy in a business cycle model with financial frictions, sticky prices
and unemployment. The main contribution of our paper is the analysis of optimal monetary policy in
alternative scenarios of banking rigidities or financial shocks. In the model, households and firms face
liquidity constraints, whereas banks supply funds using a technology that combines labor and collateral
to transform deposits into loans. Both Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) and Christiano et al. (2008)
use a Cobb-Douglas loan production function. Our approach introduces two novel features with respect
to theirs: firm equity is the asset for banking collateral (instead of capital or bonds) and the elasticity
of substitution between inputs can be parameterized at any constant value (which generalizes their unit
elasticity of substitution case). Another methodological contribution of our paper is the presence of sticky
wages and unemployment, extending the methodology of Casares (2007) to a model with financial frictions.
Even though the model does not incorporate agency costs, the combination of liquidity constraints and
a loan production technology results in a financial accelerator mechanism that propagates business cycle
fluctuations through changes in both aggregate demand and aggregate supply. Any shock that raises the
value of collateral (equity) leads to a lower interest rate charged by the banks that expands both aggregate
demand (through the lower cost of borrowing for households’ consumption and investment) and aggregate
supply (through a lower firms’ marginal cost). Hence, the effects of idiosyncratic shocks on output and
unemployment are amplified.
We carry out our analysis under two different calibrations of the banking technology. In the baseline
calibration, we aim at representing a scenario of macroeconomic stability. Hence, we match some patterns
observed in the US during the Great Moderation period, such as long-run values of financial variables and
the volatilities observed in aggregate fluctuations of output, inflation and the interest-rate spread. The real
effects of the financial accelerator mechanism in the baseline calibration are quantitatively small. However,
we find that a low elasticity of substitution between collateral and labor in loan production (rigid banking
technology) significantly increases the effects of the financial accelerator on output, unemployment and
welfare.
Regarding monetary policy, the central bank implements a Ramsey (1927)-type exercise to determine
the optimal monetary policy. Following Woodford (2003)’s quadratic approximation to the household
utility function, we derive the welfare-theoretic targeting rule under commitment. Our analysis is in line
with that of Faia and Monacelli (2007), although they do not derive explicitly the optimal monetary policy.
For a practical (instrument) rule of the central bank, we look for the policy coefficients that define the
interest-rate responses to inflation, unemployment and the external finance premium, which best fit the
optimal rule.2 Under the baseline calibration, we find that the nominal interest rate should be moderately
1Brunnermeier et al. (2012) make a magnificient survey of the literature on financial frictions in an attempt to bridge the
research coming from the fields of macroeconomics and finance.
2 In Cúrdia and Woodford (2010), a monetary policy rule á la Taylor (1993) is extended to accommodate a policy reaction to
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increased whenever either inflation is high or unemployment is low, with no significant response to the
external finance premium. This result, however, changes dramatically when assuming a rigid banking
technology. In this case, the central bank would pursue optimal monetary policy by cutting interest
rates when the external finance premium rises. Our results also indicate that banking rigidities reduce
substantially the level of social welfare. As the financial accelerator amplifies business cycle fluctuations,
the volatilities of both consumption and leisure rise and household welfare falls. Thus, the optimal policy
prescription should include a significant reversed-sign response of the nominal interest rate to the external
finance premium. In another simulation exercise, we test the behavior of the optimal monetary policy when
the business cycle is exclusively generated by financial shocks. We find that, in this case, the central bank
should be more aggressive in response to inflation, unemployment and the external finance premium. The
consequences of banking rigidities for social welfare are more harmful than in the multi-shock scenario.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, including the optimal
monetary policy. Section 3 is devoted to the baseline calibration of model parameters. In Section 4, we
carry out the monetary policy analysis that discusses the optimal design of instrument rules extended with
response coefficients to the external finance premium. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a closed-economy populated by a continuum of size one of infinitely-lived identical households,
who own a continuum of size one of both monopolistically competitive firms and competitive banks. In
each period t, households supply labor to firms and banks, demand loans, and allocate their resources
to consumption, purchases of financial assets —such as deposits and firm’s equity—, and physical capital.
Simultaneously, firms demand labor, capital, and loans in order to produce a differentiated good with
nominal rigidities on the process of setting both prices and wages. Banks issue deposits to finance them-
selves, demand labor and collateral — in the form of firm’s equity — and use these inputs to produce loans.
The central bank acts as a social planner that designs the welfare-maximizing monetary policy. We now
examine the behavior of each representative agent.
2.1 Households
At any period t, the representative household is endowed with the following stock of wealth
xtvt + dt + kt (1)
where vt is the aggregate real value of equity, xt is the fraction of equity owned, dt is her stock of real bank
deposits, and kt is capital. Household’s preferences are described by the following instantaneous utility
changes in the external finance premium. The interest-rate rule proposed in Angeloni and Faia (2013) incorporates responses
to both asset prices and the ratio of deposits over loans.
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function
c1−σt
1− σ
+Ψ
(1− nst −m
s
t )
1−γ
1− γ
(2)
where ct is the amount of consumption of a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) basket of differentiated goods, the
time endowment equals 1, and nst and m
s
t are labor services supplied to firms and banks, respectively; so
that 1 − nst −m
s
t is leisure time. The parameter Ψ > 0 determines the weight of leisure on total utility,
whereas σ, γ > 0 are respectively the elasticities of the consumption and leisure marginal utilities.
There are wage rigidities and unemployment in the firm’s labor market, but not in the bank’s labor
market. Hence, the effective labor income from working at the firms is
wtnst
1+ut
, where wt is the real wage
and ut is the unemployment rate, whereas w
m
t m
s
t is the labor income from working at the banking sector
at the real wage rate wmt . The representative household receives r
k
t kt from renting capital kt to firms at
the real rate, rkt ; collects a share xt of aggregate real dividends, et; obtains a real interest rate of r
d
t−1 per
unit of bank real deposits, dt; and a collateral service real yield, csyt, per unit of real equity holdings,
xtvt. Income is spent on consumption goods, capital accumulation, equity holdings, bank deposits, and
the interest payments of bank loans. For an investment function on capital goods, we use the specification
with adjustment costs described by Woodford (2003), that determines the amount of spending required to
increase the stock of capital from kt to kt+1 as an increasing function of their ratio, I

kt+1
kt

.3 The stock
of capital is one-period predetermined. Regarding the cost of external finance, let rlt be the real interest
rate on loans and lht the amount of real loans demanded by the household. Thus, the household’s budget
constraint in real terms becomes
wtnst
1+ut
+wmt m
s
t

+ rkt kt+xtet+ r
d
t−1dt+ csytxtvt = ct+ I

kt+1
kt

kt+(xt+1−xt)vt+(dt+1 − dt)+ r
l
tl
h
t (3)
Within each period t, we assume that there is a mismatch between the time at which household’s financial
needs emerge and the time at which household’s financial resources materialize. More precisely, households
borrow at the beginning of the period the amount lht that results from their deficit of financial resources.
When the surplus of financial resources arrives, they use their savings to make the asset portfolio choice for
the next period (optimal amounts of bank deposits, dt+1, equity holdings, xt+1, and capital, kt+1). Hence,
the liquidity constraint that gives rise to the household’s demand for real bank loans is
lht = τh

ct + I

kt+1
kt

kt

(4)
where 0 < τh < 1 is the constant share of spending to be financed externally. In period t, given a constant
discount factor β = (1 + ρ)−1 , with a rate of intertemporal preference ρ > 0, the representative household
chooses ct, n
s
t , m
s
t , kt+1, xt+1, dt+1, and l
h
t , so as to maximize intertemporal utility subject to (3) and (4).
4
3 In a steady state with no growth, the unit cost of investment is I (1) = δ, where δ is the constant rate of capital depreciation.
The first and second derivatives in steady state are I ′ (1) = 1 and I′′ (1) = ǫ, where ǫ > 0 is the parameter that defines the
adjustment cost elasticity.
4Households also choose the composition of the bundles of consumption and labor supply in relative terms to the ω good
variety, ct(ω) and n
s
t (ω). These optimal choices are shown respectively in Sections 1 and 2 of the Appendix.
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The first order conditions of the household maximization problem are
c−σt − λt − ζtτh = 0 (ct)
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m
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s
t )
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
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kt

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 
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
kt+2
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
−kt+2
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
+ I

kt+2
kt+1

= 0 (kt+1)
−λtvt + βEtλt+1 [et+1 + vt+1 (1 + csyt+1)] = 0 (xt+1)
−λt + βEtλt+1

1 + rdt

= 0 (dt+1)
−λtr
l
t + ζt = 0 (l
h
t )
where λt and ζt denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraint (3) and the demand
for loans (4), respectively. In addition, Et is the rational expectation operator conditional to the information
set available in period t. Note that, given the first order conditions, the following relationship holds
1 + rdt
−1
=
βEtλt+1
λt
= βt,t+1
where βt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor between periods t and t + 1, and the Lagrange multiplier is
the marginal utility of consumption penalized by the unit cost of borrowing
λt =
c−σt
1 + τhr
l
t
Combining first order conditions of equity holdings and deposits leads to the following equation for the
dynamics of real equity value
vt = β

1 + rdt
−1
Et [et+1 + vt+1 (1 + csyt+1)]
which entails a higher equity value, vt, when the collateral service yield of equity holdings for the next
period, csyt+1, is expected to rise.
Household’s dependence on external finance, as defined by (4), implies dynamic responses of consump-
tion, capital accumulation and labor supply to the cost of borrowing. Hence, the expressions that govern
such decisions can be obtained from combining and log-linearizing the first order conditions. Using hat-
type labels to denote log deviations from their steady state levels (e.g., ct = ln ctc , where c is the constant
level of consumption in steady state), the semi-loglinear expressions that we obtain are
ct = Etct+1 − 1
σ

rdt − ρ

−
τh
σ

rlt −Etr
l
t+1

kt+1 = 11+βkt + β1+βEtkt+2 + 1(1+β)ǫ Etrkt+1 − rk− rdt − ρ− τh rlt −Etrlt+1
n
1−n−mnst + m1−n−m mt = 1γ  wt − ut − σct − τh rlt − rl
Subsequently, the cost of borrowing, rlt, has a negative impact on consumption, capital accumulation and
labor supply. If the external finance requirement is removed (τh = 0), household’s decisions would be
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independent of the cost of borrowing, and consumption, capital accumulation and labor supply dynamics
would be the same as in a model without banking.
2.2 Firms
Firm ω specializes in the production of one differentiated consumption good, using a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction technology. In period t, the production function is
yt(ω) = e
εzt kt(ω)
αnt(ω)
1−α (5)
where yt(ω), kt(ω) and nt(ω) are, respectively, the amounts of firm-specific output, capital demand and
labor demand. In addition, εzt is an exogenous AR(1) economy-wide productivity shock, and 0 < α < 1 is
a parameter that defines the capital elasticity of output. As in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), firm ω faces the
following market demand in monopolistic competition
yt(ω) =

Pt(ω)
Pt
	−θp
yt (6)
where θp > 0 is the Dixit-Stiglitz constant elasticity of substitution across consumption goods, Pt(ω) is
the price of the good produced by the ω firm, Pt is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate price level, and yt is the
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate output.
We assume that firms must borrow liquidity in order to finance a fraction τf of their variable cost of
production. Let Wt(ω)Pt be the specific real wage of the ω firm. Then, its demand for real loans, l
f
t (ω), is
lft (ω) = τf

Wt(ω)
Pt
nt(ω) + r
k
t kt(ω)
	
(7)
Real loans must be reimbursed to the banks by the end of the period. Given rlt, loan repayments by firm
ω amount to rltl
f
t (ω), and its real earnings are
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et(ω) =
Pt(ω)
Pt
yt(ω)−
Wt(ω)
Pt
nt(ω)− r
k
t kt(ω)− r
l
tl
f
t (ω) (8)
where substituting equation (7) yields
et(ω) =
Pt(ω)
Pt
yt(ω)−

1 + τfr
l
t
Wt(ω)
Pt
nt(ω) + r
k
t kt(ω)
	
Wage rigidity
Sticky wages are introduced by assuming a Calvo (1983) lottery, whereby households and firms have a
constant probability η of not being able to revise the wage of their labor contracts.6 This lottery generates
firm’s heterogeneity in the nominal wage, Wt(ω), and the labor demand, nt(ω), as well as household’s
5A log-linear version of firm earnings is obtained in Section 3 of the Appendix.
6As in Casares (2007), wage stickiness is subject to the same lottery that governs the price stickiness introduced below.
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heterogeneity in the labor supply, nst (ω). Following Casares (2007), the nominal wage is revised in order
to make the intertemporal labor demand equal to the intertemporal labor supply at the firm level. If the
ω firm receives a Calvo signal at time t, the revision of the nominal wage would be determined as follows
∞

j=0
Eηt (βη)
j nt+j(ω)− nst+j(ω) = 0 (9)
where, Eηt is the rational expectation operator conditional on not receiving a Calvo signal for wage revisions
in the future, and
nt+j(ω)− nst+j(ω) represents the log deviation between the labor demand and labor
supply in firm ω at period t+ j, with j = 0, 1, 2, ...,∞. If wage stickiness were eliminated (η = 0), the wage
setting condition (9) would imply a perfect matching between firm-level labor supply and labor demand,
nt(ω) = n
s
t(ω).
7 Hence, nominal rigidities in wage setting open a gap between labor supply and labor
demand at firm level.8
The value of Wt(ω) required to hold (9) depends on the intertemporal labor demand and supply. The
optimal labor supply allocation of the representative household implies9
nst (ω) = θwWt(ω) + nst (10)
where Wt(ω) = Wt(ω) − Wt is the relative nominal wage at firm ω with respect to the Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregate nominal wage, θw > 0 is the Dixit-Stiglitz constant elasticity of substitution across different
types of labor supplied to firms, and nst is the log fluctuation of the aggregate labor supply to firms.
Meanwhile, firm ω labor demand is
nt(ω) = −θp Pt(ω)− αWt(ω) + nt (11)
where Pt(ω) = Pt(ω) − Pt is the relative price, and nt is the log fluctuation of aggregate labor demand.
Generalizing (10) and (11) for future periods and plugging them into (9) lead to
∞

j=0
Eηt (βη)
j

−θp Pt+j(ω)− (α+ θw)Wt+j(ω)− ut+j = 0 (12)
where we have inserted the definition of the rate of unemployment as the aggregate excess supply of labor
ut+j = nst+j − nt+j (13)
Let πt = Pt − Pt−1 and πwt = Wt −Wt−1 denote respectively price inflation and wage inflation in period
t. If the Calvo signal does not give the firm a chance to price optimally, firms adjust the previous price as
determined by the following price indexation rule
Pt(.) = Pt−1(.)(1 + π + ε
p
t )
7This would be the case for an economy with heterogeneous labor and flexible wages of the kind described in Woodford
(2003), chapter 3.
8Labor fluctuations are considered at the employment level (extensive margin) in order to provide a fundamental interpre-
tation of unemployment. Hours per worker (intensive margin) are fixed.
9See Section 2 of the Appendix for the proof and further details.
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where π denotes the steady-state rate of price inflation, and εpt is an AR(1) exogenous price-push shock.
Then, Calvo-type rigidities and price indexation imply that the conditional expectations of relative prices
and wages are, respectively, Eηt
Pt+j(ω) = Pt(ω)−jk=1Et (πt+k − π)− εpt+k and EηtWt+j(ω) = Wt(ω)−j
k=1Et

πwt+k − π
w

, which can be used in (12) to obtain
Wt(ω) = ∞
j=1
Etβ
jηj

πwt+j − π
w

−
θp
α+θw
Pt(ω)− ∞
j=1
Etβ
jηj

(πt+j − π)− ε
p
t+j

− 1−βηα+θw
∞

j=0
Etβ
jηjut+j
(14)
As indicated in (14), the relative wage Wt(ω) depends negatively on the relative price Pt(ω). Thus, the
price setting behavior must be now discussed in order to derive an expression for Pt(ω).
Price rigidity
Price setting is constrained by the same Calvo (1983) lottery as wage setting. If the market signal for
optimal pricing arrives, firm ω will choose Pt(ω), kt(ω) and nt(ω) to maximize the intertemporal earnings,∞
j=0Etβt,t+jet+j(ω), where βt,t+j =
j−1
k=0

1 + rdt+k
−1
is the stochastic discount factor from period t to
period t+j, subject to the Dixit-Stiglitz demand constraints and the Cobb-Douglas production technology.
In turn, the optimal choices of Pt(ω), kt(ω) and nt(ω) satisfy the following first order conditions
∞

j=0
Eηt βt,t+jη
j
 (1− θp)

Pt(ω)Π
p
t,t+j
Pt+j
	−θp
yt+jΠ
p
t,t+j
Pt+j
−

1 + τfr
l
t
 ∂Wt(ω)
∂Pt(ω)
nt+j(ω)
Pt+j
+ξt+j(ω)θp

Pt(ω)Π
p
t,t+j
Pt+j
	−θp−1
yt+jΠ
p
t,t+j
Pt+j
 = 0 (15)
−

1 + τfr
l
t

Wt(ω)
Pt
+ ξt(ω)
(1−α)yt(ω)
nt(ω)
= 0 (16)
−

1 + τfr
l
t

rkt + ξt(ω)
αyt(ω)
kt(ω)
= 0 (17)
where ξt+j(ω) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the demand constraint (6) in any t+j period, and
Πpt,t+j =
j
k=1

1 + π + εpt+k

is the price indexation factor between t and t+j consistent with the indexation
rule. Combining (16) and (17), we obtain that ξt(ω) is equal to the real marginal cost of production
ξt(ω) = α
−α (1− α)−(1−α)

1 + τfr
l
t

e−ε
z
t

Wt(ω)
Pt
1−α 
rkt
α
(18)
that, remarkably, incorporates the cost of borrowing,

1 + τfr
l
t

. From the log-linear equation (14) of the
previous subsection, we have a constant (negative) wage-price elasticity ∂Wt(ω)∂Pt(ω)
Wt(ω)
Pt(ω)
= − θpα+θw . Using this
result, the demand constraint (6) generalized for t+ j periods, and equation (18) also generalized for any
t+ j periods, the first order condition (15) becomes
∞

j=0
Eηt βt+jη
j

(1− θp)

Pt(ω)Π
p
t,t+j
Pt+j
	−θp
yt+jΠ
p
t,t+j
Pt+j
+ ξt+j(ω)θp(1 +
1−α
α+θw
)

Pt(ω)Π
p
t,t+j
Pt+j
	−θp−1
yt+jΠ
p
t,t+j
Pt+j

= 0
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where solving for the optimal price yields
Pt(ω) =
θp

1+
1−α
α+θw

θp−1
∞
j=0
Eηt βt+jη
jξt+j(ω)(Pt+j)
θp(Πpt,t+j)
−θpyt+j∞
j=0
Eηt βt+jη
j(Pt+j)
θp−1(Πpt,t+j)
1−θpyt+j

(19)
Following Walsh (2010) and noticing the price indexation rule, the optimal price (19) can be approximated
by the semi-loglinear expression for the relative price
Pt(ω) = (1− βη) ∞
j=0
Eηt (βη)
j
ξt+j(ω) + j

k=1

(πt+k − π)− ε
p
t+k

which is equivalent to
Pt(ω) = (1− βη) ∞
j=0
Eηt (βη)
jξt+j(ω) + ∞
j=1
Eηt (βη)
j

(πt+j − π)− ε
p
t+j

(20)
Let ξt+j(ω) = ξt+j(ω)−ξt+j be the relative real marginal cost for firm ω in period t+ j. Taking logs and
subtracting the log of aggregate variables, relation (18) implies
Eηt
ξt+j(ω) = (1− α)EηtWt+j(ω)
Plugging Eηt
Wt+j(ω) = Wt(ω) −jk=1Etπwt+k in the previous equation and the expression ξt+j(ω) =ξt+j(ω) + ξt+j in (20) lead to
Pt(ω) = (1− βη) ∞
j=0
Eηt (βη)
j
ξt+j + (1− α)
Wt(ω)− j
k=1
Etπ
w
t+k

+
∞
j=1
Eηt (βη)
j

(πt+j − π)− ε
p
t+j

or the equivalent (simpler) expression for relative prices
Pt(ω) = (1− α)Wt(ω) + (1− βη) ∞
j=0
Eηt (βη)
jξt+j + ∞
j=1
Eηt (βη)
j

(πt+j − π)− ε
p
t+j − (1− α)π
w
t+j

(21)
New Keynesian Phillips Curves
As a well-known result, Calvo-type rigidities imply a proportional relationship between relative prices
and the rate of inflation. For both prices and nominal wages, we respectively have
Pt(ω) = η1−η ((πt − π)− εpt ) and Wt(ω) = η1−η (πwt − πw) (22)
which can jointly be plugged in (21) to reach
(πt − π)− ε
p
t = (1− α) (π
w
t − π
w) + (1−βη)(1−η)η
∞
j=0
Eηt (βη)
jξt+j
+ (1−η)η
∞
j=1
Eηt (βη)
j

(πt+j − π)− ε
p
t+j − (1− α)π
w
t+j

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Taking the difference (πt − π)− βηEt (πt+1 − π) , results in the following price inflation equation
πt − π = βEt (πt+1 − π) + (1− α)

(πwt − π
w)− βEt

πwt+1 − π
w

+ (1−βη)(1−η)η
ξt + εpt − βEtεpt+1 (23)
Let us now recall the relative wage setting obtained in (14) where there is an inverse relation between wage
and price setting. Using the expressions of both Pt(ω) and Wt(ω) from (22) and plugging them in (14)
gives the wage inflation equation
(πwt − π
w) = 1−ηη
∞
j=1
Etβ
jηjπwt+j

πwt+j − π
w

− (1−βη)(1−η)η(α+θw)
∞

j=0
Etβ
jηjut+j −
θp
α+θw
((πt − π)− ε
p
t )
+ θp(1−η)η(α+θw)
∞
j=1
Etβ
jηj

(πt+j − π)− ε
p
t+j

where taking the first difference, πwt − βηEtπ
w
t+1, we obtain
(πwt − π
w) = βEt

πwt+1 − π
w

− (1−βη)(1−η)η(α+θw) ut −
θp
α+θw

((πt − π)− ε
p
t )− βEt

πpt+1 − π
p

− εpt+1

(24)
Inserting in (24) the expression of (πt − π)−Etβ (πt+1 − π) obtained in (23) brings, after some rearranging,
the wage inflation equation
πwt − π
w = βEt

πwt+1 − π
w

− (1−η)(1−βη)η(α+θw+θp(1−α))

ut + θpξt (25)
Expression (25) somehow resembles an old-fashion Phillips curve in the negative relationship between wage
inflation, πwt , and the rate of unemployment, ut. There is also some negative effect from fluctuations in the
real marginal cost (and thus the firm cost of borrowing) as a consequence of the interdependence between
wage setting and pricing. An increase in firm-specific marginal costs would raise the relative price and
reduce relative labor demand, which would push nominal wages downwards according to (9).
Finally, the value (πwt − π
w) − βEt

πwt+1 − π
w

implied by (24) can be used in the inflation equation
(23) to derive a New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC)
πt − π = βEt (πt+1 − π) +
(1−η)(1−βη)(α+θw)
η(α+θw+θp(1−α))
ξt − (1−α)(α+θw)ut+ 1− βρp εpt
where price inflation is forward looking and depends on the fluctuations of the aggregate real marginal
cost, ξt, on the rate of unemployment, ut, and on the price-push shock, εpt . Unlike other NKPC existing
in the literature, the presence of ut is explained by its influence on the wage setting and therefore on the
optimal price setting.10 In addition, financial frictions have an indirect influence in the dynamics of the
NKPC because the real interest rate on loans, rlt, is one of the variables that determine fluctuations in the
aggregate real marginal cost
ξt = τf rlt − rl+ (1− α) wt + αrk rkt − rk− εzt
10The firm-specific nominal wage depends negatively on firm-level unemployment and determines the firm-specific real
marginal cost. As firms set prices by foreseeing current and expected future fluctuations on real marginal costs, an increase
in the rate of unemployment will have deflationary effects.
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2.3 Banks
There is a perfectly competitive banking industry that provides external finance to households and firms.
Banks issue deposits as its source of funding, and they employ some labor for the monitoring of the actual
value of the borrowers’ collateral. Hence, in period t, the representative bank uses a technology of loan
production that combines labor, mt, and the real value of equity, vt, which it is the asset used as collateral,
to transform the amount of real deposits dt, into real loans, lt.
In line with agency costs models (Townsend, 1979; Bernanke and Gertler, 1989), the loan production
function may be interpreted as a reduced form that captures the fact that — in the presence of informational
asymmetries — both labor-intensive monitoring services and collateral play a crucial role in: (i) aligning
borrowers’ and lenders’ incentives, i.e. ameliorating moral hazard, and/or (ii) providing information about
borrowers’ characteristics, i.e. reducing adverse selection, so that, other things equal, the amount of loans
that a bank is willing to supply increases with both of them. Our loan production technology takes the
following constant elasticity of substitution (CES) specification
lt = dtB[a

eε
l
tvt
χ
+ (1− a)mχt ]
1
χ (26)
where B > 0 is the scale parameter, −∞ < χ ≤ 1 is the elasticity parameter, 0 < a < 1 is the weight
of collateral, and εlt is an exogenous AR(1) collateral-augmenting shock. The elasticity of substitution
between collateral, vt, and bank labor, mt, is constant at
1
1−χ . This brings the upper bound, χ = 1, when
loan production converges to a linear function with perfect substitutability between the two factors (infinite
elasticity). When χ approaches to its lower bound, χ = −∞, the loan production function turns into a
Leontief technology, with no substitutability (zero elasticity). As an intermediate case, the Cobb-Douglas
technology is particularized by (26) when χ approaches to 0 and there is a unit elasticity of substitution
(as in Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007; and Christiano et al., 2008).
The amount of deposits is demand-determined, given the real interest rate on deposits, rdt = Rt−Etπt+1,
where Rt is the nominal interest rate set by the central bank. Banks must serve r
d
t−1 per unit of real deposit
taken, and receive rlt per unit of real loan. Hence, the profit function of the representative bank can be
written as follows
rltlt − csytvt −w
m
t mt − r
d
t−1dt (27)
Abstracting from bank reserves, the balance sheet of the bank reads
dt = lt (28)
The bank operates competitively in the market for labor and collateral, taking the collateral service yield
of equity csyt and the banking real wage rate, w
m
t , as given. Inserting equation (28) and the technological
constraint (26) in the profit function (27), and taking the partial derivatives with respect to the input
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demands, mt and vt, result in the following first order conditions for profit maximization
rlt − r
d
t−1
 (1− a)mχ−1t lt
a

eε
l
tvt
χ
+ (1− a)mχt
−wmt = 0 (mt)

rlt − r
d
t−1
 aeχεltvχ−1t lt
a

eε
l
tvt
χ
+ (1− a)mχt
− csyt = 0 (vt)
The real interest rate on loans consistent with the banking labor demand equation (mt) is
rlt = r
d
t−1 +
wmt
(1−a)mχ−1t lt
a

eε
l
tvt
χ
+(1−a)mχt
(29)
which has two components:
- the real interest rate paid for the deposit used to produce the loan (rdt−1), and
- the marginal cost of labor required to transform one unit of deposits in one unit of loans (
wmt
∂lt/∂mt
).
The semi-loglinear approximation to (29) gives
rlt − r
l =

rdt−1 − r
d

+ (rl − rd)
 wmt − lt + (1−Ωχ) mt +Ωχvt + εlt (30)
where Ω = av
χ
avχ+(1−a)mχ is the steady-state share of collateral (equity) in loan production. The financial
accelerator mechanism can be reflected through the inverse relation between fluctuations of equity, vt, and
the cost of loans, rlt, obtained for values of χ < 0. The reaction of r
l
t to a change in collateral is stronger
when the steady-state spread, rl − rd, is higher; the steady-state share of collateral, Ω, is higher; and the
elasticity of substitution, 1/(1− χ), is lower. Regarding the last effect, a very high and negative χ, which
implies a very low elasticity of substitution, makes the effect of vt over rlt huge. That might be considered
a “real” rigidity for loan production in the sense discussed by Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010). Accordingly,
we consider that a loan production technology is rigid (flexible) when it is characterized by a low (high)
elasticity of substitution between its inputs.11
Based on the above first order conditions, the equilibrium return for the collateral service of equity
turns out to be
csyt =

rlt − r
d
t−1
 lt
vt
a

eε
l
tvt
χ
a

eε
l
tvt
χ
+ (1− a)mχt
where plugging in expression (29) simplifies to
csyt = w
m
t
a
(1− a)

mt
eε
l
tvt
	1−χ
(31)
11The optimal allocation of banking inputs implies
wmt
csyt
= 1−a
a

e
εltvt
mt
1−χ
, i.e. the standard microeconomic condition that
equalizes the ratio of input prices to the ratio of their marginal products. Hence, a greater rigidity on banking can be captured
by a lower value of the elasticity of substitution (1− χ)−1. Either a financial shock, εlt, or a change in collateral, vt, will have
larger effects on the relative price of inputs,
wmt
csyt
, because of the loss of efficiency at factor substitutability.
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Finally, the (collateralized) external finance premium, efpt, can be defined as the difference between the
real interest rate on loans and the real returns collected by the households from the bank (which include
both returns on deposits and equity). Formally, this implies
efpt = r
l
t − r
d
t−1 −
csytvt
lt
=

rlt − r
d
t−1

1−
a

eε
l
tvt
χ
a

eε
l
tvt
χ
+(1−a)mχt

(32)
which in steady state becomes efp =

rl − rd

(1−Ω). The external finance premium actually represents
the spread between the interest rate of collateralized loans (rlt −
csytvt
lt
) and the return obtained from
providing deposits to the banks (rdt−1).
12 If no monitoring labor is required to produce them (a = 1),
the external finance premium is equal to zero as the interest rate spread is totally compensated by the
collateral service return, rlt − r
d
t−1 =
csytvt
lt
. In the opposite extreme case, if equity does not yield any
collateral service for loan production (a = 0), the external finance premium coincides with the interest-rate
spread.
2.4 Central bank
The central bank acts as a social planner who maximizes household’s utility subject to the competitive
equilibrium. Let us formally introduce the variable leist = 1− nt −mt as the amount of leisure time. In
the tradition of Ramsey (1927), the bank chooses prices and quantities in competitive equilibrium in order
to maximize intertemporal household utility. In particular, we follow Woodford (2003) to have the central
bank in period t maximizing the following quadratic approximation to household’s intertemporal utility
Wt =
∞

j=0
βj

c1−σ
ct+j − (σ − 1)
2
c2t+j	+Ψleis1−γ leist+j − (γ − 1)2 leis2t+j
		
(33)
subject to the set of constraints that describe the competitive equilibrium of the economy. Intuitively,
the welfare function (33) indicates that the level of either consumption or leisure raises welfare whereas
their square log deviations with respect to the steady state levels reduce welfare. The central bank is
committed to preserve the optimal monetary policy in the future. Particularly, we follow the "timeless
perspective" approach described in Woodford (1999, page 18). Monetary policy is decided as a plan that
should be preserved in any present, current or future period. This implies that the equations that describe
the state of the economy must be considered as constraints for any period. The result is a targeting rule
under commitment which outperforms the targeting rule under discretion (Svensson and Woodford, 2005;
Giannoni and Woodford, 2005). Hence, the set of equations describing the dynamics of the economy, which
the central bank takes as constraints in the optimizing program, are considered at any t + j period for
j = ...,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, ... The law of iterated expectations is used in the optimal control exercise.
12This notion of the external finance premium is consistent with models featuring financial frictions a la Bernanke and
Gertler (1989) where higher net worth (collateral) reduces agency costs and the external finance premium is lower.
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Due to its space requirements, Section 7 of the Appendix describes the optimal control exercise of the
central bank. The targeting rule comprises 31 equations that may provide solution paths for the 16 endoge-
nous variables listed above plus the 15 Lagrange multipliers of the competitive-equilibrium constraints.
2.5 Overall resources constraint
Using the cost of borrowing, rltl
h
t = r
l
tτh

ct + I

kt+1
kt

kt

, the zero-profit condition for the competitive
bank,

rlt − r
d
t−1

lt = w
m
t mt + csytvt, and the equilibrium condition for banking labor, m
s
t = mt, in the
household budget constraint (3), we obtain
wtnst
1+ut
+ rkt kt + xtet + r
d
t−1dt +

rlt − r
d
t−1

lt + csytvt (xt − 1) =
1 + τhr
l
t

ct +

1 + τhr
l
t

I

kt+1
kt
	
kt + (xt+1 − xt)vt + (dt+1 − dt)
Next, the introduction of the portfolio investment equilibrium conditions, xt = 1 and xt+1 = 1, together
with the bank balance sheet (lt = dt) yield
wtnst
1+ut
+ rkt kt + et + r
l
tlt =

1 + τhr
l
t

ct +

1 + τhr
l
t

I

kt+1
kt
	
kt + (dt+1 − dt)
Since the definition of the rate of unemployment is
ut =
nst
nt
− 1
this implies that nst = (1 + ut)nt, and the household budget constraint in terms of effective labor income
becomes
wtnt + r
k
t kt + et + r
l
tlt =

1 + τhr
l
t

ct +

1 + τhr
l
t

I

kt+1
kt
	
kt + (dt+1 − dt)
Meanwhile, aggregate real earnings are
et =
 1
0
et(ω)dω =
1
Pt
 1
0
Pt(ω)yt(ω)dω −
1
Pt
 1
0
Wt(ω)nt(ω)dω − r
k
t
 1
0
kt(ω)dω − r
l
t
 1
0
lt(ω)dω
= yt −wtnt − r
k
t kt − r
l
tlt
with real aggregate output, yt =
1
Pt
 1
0 Pt(ω)yt(ω)dω, real aggregate labor costs, wtnt =
1
Pt
 1
0 Wt(ω)nt(ω)dω,
real aggregate capital rental cost, rkt kt = r
k
t
 1
0 kt(ω)dω, and real aggregate loans, lt =
 1
0 lt(ω)dω. Inserting
real aggregate earnings, et = yt −wtnt − r
k
t kt − r
l
tlt, in the income-expenditures expression, we get
yt =

1 + τhr
l
t

ct +

1 + τhr
l
t

I

kt+1
kt
	
kt + (dt+1 − dt)
The uses of output are consumption, capital accumulation, and net increase in deposits. Recalling the
steady-state properties of the investment function, and since the change in deposits is zero in steady state,
the loglinearized overall resources constraint determines log-fluctuations of output as a weighted average
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between log-fluctuations of consumption and log-fluctuations of investment spending, augmented with the
cost of the external finance,

rlt − r
l

:
yt = (1+τhrl)cy ct + (1+τhrl)δky 1δkt+1 − (1−δ)δ kt+ τh rlt − rl (34)
The equilibrium conditions in the goods market, asset markets and labor markets are discussed in Section
4 of the Appendix. As a summary of the model, both the steady-state non-linear system of equations and
the complete set of log-linearized dynamic equations are respectively displayed in Sections 5 and 6 of the
Appendix.
3 Calibration
Table 1 describes the baseline calibration of the model for quarterly periods. The intertemporal discount
factor is set at β = 0.995, obtained from a rate of intertemporal preference ρ = 0.005 that implies a 2%
annualized steady-state real rate of return for deposits. The utility function is set with a consumption
elasticity of marginal utility at σ = 1.5, in line with the empirical estimates of the US and the Euro Area
economies (Smets and Wouters, 2003 and 2007). The parameter that measures the weight of leisure in
the utility function takes the value Ψ = 0.48, which implies that 1/3 of total time is spent at work in the
steady-state solution of the model, n+m = 13 . The leisure curvature parameter is calibrated to induce a
low labor supply Frisch elasticity as found in most empirical evidence (Altonji, 1986; Pencavel, 1986; and
Domeij and Flodén, 2006). We set γ = 4 so that labor supply elasticity, 1γ
1−(n+m)
n , turns out to be slightly
below 0.5.
The elasticity of the stock of capital in the production of goods is α = 0.3, which results in the
steady-state income shares of 54% for labor, 23% for capital and 23% for equity. The rate of capital
depreciation is fixed at δ = 0.025 in order to imply an annualized depreciation rate of 10%. The elasticity
of the adjustment cost function, ǫ, is set at a value that provides a volatility of investment (measured
by its standard deviation) that is three times higher than the one of consumption, as observed in the
US (Casares et al., 2014). This leads to assign a value of ǫ = 4.5. The elasticity of substitution across
consumption goods is θp = 10, and the elasticity of substitution across labor services is θw = 4, which
jointly imply a 29% mark-up in steady state.13 Price and wage rigidities are introduced with the same
Calvo-type probability η = 0.75 to have the average frequency of optimal setting at one time per year, as
suggested by Taylor (1999a) and commonly assumed in the New Keynesian literature.
The parameters that govern the financial aspects of the model are calibrated using data from the Great
Moderation period that runs from 1984:1 to 2007:4 (usually referred as normal times).14 The coefficients
13The optimality condition for pricing, equation (19), leads to a mark-up in steady state equal to:
θp
θp−1

1 + 1−α
α+θw

− 1.
14Our US data source is the FRED database released by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, except for the series of the
interest-rate spreads that is taken from the website of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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that determine the borrowing requirements for firms and households are assigned at the values that provide
a good matching to the average of the stock of loans relative to GDP found in the US. For household loans,
lht , we use the series of Consumer Loans and for firm loans, l
f
t , we consider the series of Commercial and
Industrial Loans. We match the steady-state ratios in the model, lh/y and lf/y, to the average of real loans
to quarterly real GDP observed in the US during the Great Moderation that are, respectively, lh/y = 0.23
and lf/y = 0.38. To accomplish this matching, the required values used in the baseline calibration are
τh = 0.24 and τf = 0.51.
Table 1. Baseline calibration.
Parameter description Value
β, intertemporal discount factor 0.995
σ, elasticity of consumption marg. utility 1.50
γ, elasticity of leisure marg. utility 4.00
Ψ, leisure weight in total utility 0.48
α, capital share in goods production 0.30
δ, rate of capital depreciation 0.025
ǫ, capital adjustment costs elasticity 4.5
χ, curvature in loan production 0.0
a, collateral weight in loan production 0.65
B, scale parameter in loan production 0.66
τf , firm external finance 0.24
τh, household external finance 0.51
θp, Dixit-Stiglitz demand elasticity 10.0
θw, Dixit-Stiglitz labor supply elasticity 4.0
η, probability of price/wage rigidity 0.75
In the baseline calibration of the CES loan production technology (26), the elasticity parameter, χ,
is parameterized at the Cobb-Douglas case (χ = 0.0) in order to provide a unit elasticity of substitution
between collateral and labor, (1− χ)−1 = 1, commonly assumed in the related literature. This elasticity
parameter will be modified later in order to examine monetary policy under deeper banking rigidities.
Following Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), we set a = 0.65 in order to obtain a 65% collateral share for
loan production in steady state. The scale parameter of loan production, B, is fixed at the value that results
in a steady-state external finance premium efp = 0.01, i.e. 4% in annualized terms. Such value coincides
with the sample average of the series Commercial and Industrial Loan Rates Spreads over intended Federal
Funds Rate, available for the period 1986:3-2007:4, which requires setting B = 0.66.15 The size of the
15We looked at the series of loans of size "Less than $100,000" to represent the case of short-run collateralized lending (one
quarter duration) that is assumed in the model. The average interest-rate spread is 4%. For larger loans the spread is lower.
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banking sector that results in the model is consistent with empirical evidence: the steady-state ratio of
banking labor over total labor is mn = 0.0115 (1.15%) in the model, whereas in the US data the average ratio
of Employees in Commercial Banking over Total Nonfarm Payroll during the Great Moderation period
was very close to 1%.
The parameters that characterize the exogenous shocks are calibrated to match both the volatility and
the persistence of the quarterly series of fluctuations of US real GDP, inflation and the interest-rate spread
during the available sample period 1986:3-2007:4. The indicator of cyclical fluctuations of output, yt, has
been obtained by filtering the log of the US Real GDP with a linear trend. The rate of inflation is the
rate of growth of the GDP Implicit Price Deflator of the US economy, and the interest-rate spread is
measured by the series of external finance premium mentioned above. The model has been simulated for
106 observations and the first 20 were discarded to guarantee a random start (which might be different
from the steady state) and the same number of observations as in the time series of the actual data.
The simulations were repeated 10,000 times and average values of standard deviations and coefficients of
autocorrelation were computed. We have selected the coefficients of autocorrelation of the AR(1) shocks
and the standard deviation of their innovations to provide a good empirical fit to the US second-moment
statistics. Table 2 collects the values set and the comparison between the autocorrelation and volatilities
of output fluctuations, inflation and the interest-rate spread generated by the model and in the data.
Table 2. Calibration and empirical fit
Calibration of the AR(1) shocks:
Autocorrelation Standard deviation, %
Technology shocks 0.96 0.69
Price-push shocks 0.60 0.18
Financial shocks 0.97 1.79
Statistics of persistence and volatility:
Autocorrelation Standard deviation, %
US data (86:3-07:4) Model US data (86:3-07:4) Modely, log fluctuations of real GDP 0.95 0.93 1.68 1.68
4π, rate of inflation (ann.) 0.61 0.62 0.91 0.91
4efp, interest-rate spread (ann.) 0.93 0.92 0.39 0.39
4 Monetary policy analysis
In order to understand the interactions between monetary policy, banking, and financial shocks, the stabi-
lizing performance of monetary policy rules is examined under the baseline calibration in comparison with
three alternative scenarios:
i) High banking rigidities, introduced by setting a low elasticity of substitution at loan production. The
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baseline calibration (χ = 0) implies a unit elasticity of substitution, (1− χ)−1 = 1. For a more rigid loan
production technology, we set χ = −9 which results in a much lower elasticity of substitution for collateral
(1− (−9))−1 = 0.1.16 We recall that a lower elasticity of substitution of inputs means a less efficient
technology because the input substitution along an isoquant (keeping production constant) is more costly.
ii) Financial business cycle, i.e. aggregate fluctuations driven exclusively by financial shocks. Thus, the
other exogenous sources of variability (technology shocks and price-push shocks) are shut down by setting
their standard deviations at 0.0 (σz = σp = 0).
iii) High banking rigidities under financial business cycle obtained by simultaneously setting (1− χ)−1 =
0.1 and σz = σp = 0.
The monetary policy of the baseline model is the Ramsey-type targeting rule described in Subsection
2.4. However, the central bank may not be able to implement such targeting rule because of the following
practical reasons. First, some of the variables of the rule are not observable (for example, the exogenous
shocks). Second, the targeting rule itself comprises one set of 31 equations (displayed in Section 7 of
the Appendix) that must hold simultaneously, involving rational expectations and exogenous sources of
variability. Processing all that information would be a colossal work for the central bank. Third, central
banks usually announce monetary policy actions through changes in the nominal interest rate for interbank
borrowing. Based on these arguments, and on the problems of lack of robustness to model changes found in
targeting rules (Levin and Williams, 2003), we also take the instrumental rule approach (McCallum, 1988;
Taylor, 1999b) to propose an interest-rate rule that would set the nominal interest rate of deposits in a way
that best mimicks the prescription of the targeting rule.17 The variables that the central bank responds
to are now both observable and relevant: the rate of inflation (most central banks of modern economies
follow inflation targeting policies), the rate of unemployment (central banks also tend to look carefully
at developments in the labor market) and the external finance premium as an indicator of the financial
tightness observed in the banking sector.18 Formally, such instrument rule can be written as follows
Rt −R = µπ (πt − π) + µuut + µefp (efpt − efp) + ε
R
t (35)
where the sign of the policy coefficients are conjectured to be µπ > 0, µu < 0, and µefp < 0. The exogenous
component, εRt , brings the non-systematic policy actions, which may include the errors in replicating the
optimal policy.
The optimized coefficients of the instrument rule (35) have been estimated from simulations of the model
with the optimal monetary policy (targeting rule). As assumed in the calibration, every model simulation
16The weight coefficient of the loan production technology, a, has been reset to keep the collateral share in steady-state, Ω,
unchanged at 65%.
17The model abstracts from interbank lending and borrowing. The interest rate of deposits represents the referential rate
of return for any risk-free one period asset.
18Unconventional monetary policies might be desirable in the presence of financial frictions as discussed in Cúrdia and
Woodford (2010).
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contains 106 observations and the first 20 are dropped. With the 86 remaining observations, we run an
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of (35) and store the estimates of the policy coefficients µπ, µu
and µefp, as well as the series of residuals. We repeat the simulation exercise and the OLS estimation for
10,000 times and compute the average and standard deviation of the estimated policy coefficients. Table
3 collects the mean and standard deviation of the estimates in the four alternative scenarios mentioned
above
Table 3. Optimized monetary policy coefficients for the instrument rule (35).
Systematic Residuals
µπ µu µefp ρεR σκR ,%
Baseline calibration
Mean 0.59 -0.10 0.03 0.74 0.0233
Standard deviation (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.07) (0.0022)
High banking rigidities
Mean 0.63 -0.08 -0.16 0.72 0.0258
Standard deviation (0.02) (0.01) (0.07) (0.07) (0.0027)
Financial business cycle
Mean 1.57 -0.34 -0.26 0.06 0.0022
Standard deviation (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (0.00021)
High banking rigidities and financial business cycle
Mean 1.86 -0.37 -3.89 0.59 0.0119
Standard deviation (0.19) (0.05) (0.61) (0.08) (0.0024)
In the baseline calibration, the implementation of the optimal (Ramsey-type) rule brings significant
reactions of the nominal interest rate to inflation deviations (µπ = 0.59) and to the rate of unemployment
(µu = −0.10). The signs of the central-bank responses are the ones expected for the goal of stabilizing
aggregate fluctuations in the goods and labor markets. However, the optimized response to the external
finance premium is slightly positive (µefp = 0.03), though not statistically significant because the standard
deviation of the estimate is 0.04 (accepting the null hypothesis of having µefp = 0.0 in the Student’s t-test).
Thus, in the baseline calibration of the model the central bank should not pay any significant attention
to the changes in the external finance premium. This result changes under alternative calibrations as we
show below.
Some of the variability of the nominal interest rate under the optimal rule cannot be captured by the
systematic part of the instrument rule (35) and goes in the error term, εRt . Its generating process can
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also be estimated from the residuals of the simulations. We test the AR(1) model, εRt = ρεRε
R
t−1 + κ
R
t ,
where |ρεR | < 1 is the coefficient of autocorrelation and the innovation κ
R
t is white noise with a constant
standard deviation, σ
κR . Both ρεR and σκR have been estimated as the average values obtained from
running OLS regressions of the the 10,000 simulated series of residuals. As Table 3 displays, the residuals
are moderately autocorrelated (ρεR = 0.74) and their innovations have a low standard deviation (σκR =
0.0233%). These monetary shocks are the result of not being able to completely replicate the optimal rule
using the instrument rule (35).
When banking rigidities are high (low elasticity of substitution for the inputs of loan production,
(1− χ)−1 = 0.1), the optimal policy reaction constrained to (35) results in a slightly stronger response
to inflation deviations and a slightly milder one to the rate of unemployment (compare numbers in Table
3). The impact of banking rigidities on the optimized instrumental policy is really important for the
coefficient of reactions to the external finance premium. This turns around from being virtually none
to having a negative value (µefp = −0.16) with a standard deviation of the estimate at 0.07. There is
an intuitive interpretation of this finding: since high banking rigidities amplify the financial accelerator
effects, the central bank should take a more aggressive stand on controlling its fluctuations. If the external
finance premium rises, the optimal policy recommends a expansionary monetary policy (lower interest
rates) to stimulate demand and overcome the contractionary effects of higher cost of borrowing. Let us
recall that the Ramsey-type optimal policy derived in our model is aimed at minimizing the volatilities of
both consumption and leisure, which require stability in both the goods and labor markets, respectively.
Targeting rules are model specific. Furthermore, they must rely on a particular model calibration. Our
baseline calibration is meant to illustrate mild business cycles (as viewed in the Great Moderation period).
Would the optimal policy rule change if business cycles were not conventional? In particular, what would
optimal monetary policy be like in a business cycle driven by financial shocks? We have investigated these
questions by recalibrating the model with only financial shocks. Such scenario is designed shutting down
both technology and price-push shocks (σz = σp = 0), and raising the standard deviation of financial
shocks by 10 times the value initially assumed (10σl). We have solved the model with the welfare-theoretic
targeting rule and then we have approximated that optimal policy with the OLS-estimated instrument rule
(35). As Table 4 shows, the policy prescriptions change dramatically relative to the baseline calibration.
The central bank should be much more aggressive in the interest-rate responses to both the rate of inflation
(µπ = 1.57) and the rate of unemployment (µu = −0.34) than in the case of business cycles driven by the
three shocks. The reaction to the external finance premium is also stronger (µefp = −0.26).
Finally, we have also examined the banking sector with low elasticity of substitution and financial
shocks. The estimated policy coefficients consistent with the optimal rule are slightly higher than in the case
with unit elasticity. However, the intervention to stabilize the spread turns much deeper (µefp = −3.89) to
refrain the need of controlling the impact of the financial accelerator on consumption and leisure variability.
Next, we carry out some analysis of the impulse-response functions and the volatilities of the variables
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under the baseline calibration and the three alternative scenarios mentioned above. In addition, we have
computed the unconditional expectation of the central-bank objective function to measure the welfare
level attained. For comparative purposes, the performance of the Taylor (1993) rule is also going to be
examined, as a well-known prescription for macroeconomic stability with an instrument rule over normal
times such as the Great Moderation. Taking Taylor (1993)’s original coefficients for the responses of the
nominal interest rate to inflation deviations and for the responses to fluctuations of output, we have19
Rt −R = 1.5 (πt − π) +
0.5
4
yt
Table 4 provides the standard deviations of key variables and the welfare level.
Table 4. Stabilizing performance of monetary policy rules.
Standard deviations, % Welfarey u 4R 4π v 4efp c leis 106E [W]
Baseline calibration
Optimal rule 1.68 0.41 0.64 0.91 1.60 0.39 1.17 0.24 -66.15
Optimized instrument rule (35) 1.37 0.81 0.92 1.15 1.28 0.38 0.92 0.49 -94.42
Taylor rule 1.20 1.40 1.49 1.39 0.99 0.38 0.71 0.79 -183.59
High banking rigidities
Optimal rule 1.62 0.76 0.87 1.16 1.49 0.33 1.29 0.33 -90.65
Optimized instrument rule (35) 1.14 1.30 1.30 1.56 1.26 0.32 0.87 0.66 -146.97
Taylor rule 1.42 1.49 1.62 1.54 1.03 0.36 1.14 0.83 -230.66
Financial business cycle
Optimal rule 0.21 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.17 1.18 0.30 0.07 -4.62
Optimized instrument rule (35) 0.21 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.17 1.18 0.30 0.07 -4.74
Taylor rule 0.28 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.11 1.19 0.32 0.10 -6.38
High banking rigidities and financial business cycle
Optimal rule 0.40 1.48 1.25 1.65 2.79 0.98 1.28 0.37 -98.44
Optimized instrument rule (35) 0.42 1.47 1.28 1.68 2.82 1.00 1.32 0.36 -100.12
Taylor rule 1.82 1.50 1.42 1.54 1.54 1.10 2.45 1.03 -490.93
Let us further discuss the results looking at the graphical analysis of impulse-response functions for the
three different shocks included in the model: technology shock, inflation shock and financial shock.
19The reader may notice that the response coefficient to output fluctuations comes in divided by 4. This transformation is
made because Taylor (1993) estimates a policy rule where the interest rate was expressed in annualized rates of return and
our model has been calibrated for quarterly observations.
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4.1 Technology shock
Figure 1 shows the impulse-response functions obtained from a technology shock of size equivalent to one
standard deviation. Responses are compared across the alternative monetary policy rules and the level
of banking rigidities. Remarkably, the implementation of the optimal targeting rule leads to the largest
reactions on output and consumption, amplifying the expansionary effects of the technology shock in the
goods market, relative to the action observed with the Taylor rule. By contrast, both unemployment and
leisure get more stabilized with the optimal monetary policy than with the Taylor rule, which indicates
that the labor market effects are dampened. It could be said that the optimal monetary policy is aimed
at restoring the flexible-wage scenario. Although it is not shown in Figure 1, the rise of wage inflation
with the optimal rule is nearly twice the one observed with the Taylor rule. Equity, the external finance
premium and inflation have similar responses under the three rules. Also under the three rules, the
financial accelerator works as firm equity rises and the countercyclical external finance premium stimulates
demand (both consumption and investment increase with lower cost of borrowing) and reduces the real
marginal cost. The nominal interest rate under the optimal rule falls at a lower extent than the Taylor
rule prescription.
If loan production is subject to real rigidities (see right-side cells of Figure 1), the optimal rule has some
additional difficulties on stabilizing consumption and leisure. In turn, the level of social welfare is lower with
banking rigidities. Table 4 shows higher standard deviations of the two targeted variables (consumption
and investment) in the model calibration with low banking elasticity, (1− χ)−1 = 0.1, compared to the
baseline calibration. Under the optimal policy, the standard deviation of consumption increases from 1.17%
to 1.29% and the standard deviation of leisure from 0.24% to 0.33%. In turn, social welfare with banking
rigidities falls by approximately 37% (from -66.15 to -90.65).20
Finally, the optimized instrument rule (35) does a better job approximating the targeting rule in the
model without severe banking rigidities (baseline calibration). The low elasticity of substitution pushes
the financial accelerator mechanism and the central bank must react to the external finance premium.
As can be viewed in Figure 1, the dashed lines (optimized instrument rule) are more separated from the
solid lines (targeting rules) in the case of banking rigidities. The welfare loss from applying the optimized
instrument rule is found higher with banking rigidities than in the baseline calibration according to the
numbers reported in Table 4.
4.2 Inflation shock
Figure 2 shows the effects of a price-push shock of size equivalent to its calibrated standard deviation. The
targeting rule nearly achieves full stabilization as the responses of output, consumption, leisure and the
20 It should be noticed that Table 4 reports the welfare levels in one million times actual units, due to the small numbers
delivered as actual units.
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Figure 1: Technology shock. Impulse-response functions under alternative monetary policy rules and
banking rigidity.
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Figure 2: Inflation shock. Impulse-response functions under alternative monetary policy rules and banking
rigidity.
25
rate of unemployment are virtually flat. This desirable result is obtained with a moderate increase in the
nominal interest rate at the time of the inflation hike (around half of the size of the increase obtained with
a Taylor rule). Subsequently, the contributions of the inflation shock to the overall variability of output,
unemployment, equity, the external finance premium, consumption and leisure are very small under the
targeting rule. As commented above, technology shocks would explain most of the volatility of these
variables. The optimized instrument rule (35), displayed with dashed lines in Figure 2 brings a small
decline of output and consumption and a slight increase of unemployment. This economic contraction
is quantitatively much larger if the Taylor rule is in place (dotted lines). Either the targeting rule or
the optimized instrument rule provide crucial monetary policy reactions to stabilize the economy after an
inflationary shock.
So, the implementation of the targeting rule recommends a small increase in the nominal interest rate
that keeps the real interest rate unchanged in the presence of an inflation shock. With no significant change
in the real interest rate, both consumption and investment will not fall and the economic recession does
not develop. In the labor market, the rate of unemployment rises by more than 0.4% with the Taylor rule,
whereas it barely changes if the targeting rule is implemented (actually, it goes slightly down because labor
supply falls due to welfare effects). The model with the optimized instrument rule displays a slight increase
of unemployment. Leisure time rises as a consequence of less effective labor employed. In terms of welfare,
the optimal rule provides a much higher value than the Taylor rule because both consumption and leisure
would be stabilized around their steady state levels and their square deviations around them are really
small. The inflation shock mostly explains why the Taylor rule performs so poorly for macroeconomic
stabilization and for attaining social welfare (numbers reported in Table 4).
The case with banking rigidities is almost indistinguishable from the baseline calibration. Looking at
Figure 2, it could be said the responses of output, consumption, unemployment and leisure are slightly
deeper (a few basis points) on the right-side plots compared to the left-side plots. The effects of the inflation
shock on either the external finance premium or the cost of borrowing are small and the consequences of
having more or less banking rigidities are not significant.
4.3 Financial shock
Finally, in Figure 3 we can see the responses to a shock of size equivalent to one standard deviation, which
brings an exogenous increase in the effective amount of collateral for loan production. Both the choice of
a monetary policy rule and the extent of banking rigidities play a key role on shaping the responses of
macroeconomic variables. Regarding the latter, if banking rigidities are high, the quantitative implications
of the financial shock are substantially greater. This finding is robust to any monetary policy setting. Thus,
the effects of the financial shock are between five and ten times larger on unemployment, consumption and
leisure with a lower banking elasticity (right-side plots of Figure 3) than in the baseline calibration (left-side
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Figure 3: Financial shock. Impulse-response functions under alternative monetary policy rules and banking
rigidity.
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plots of Figure 3). Having the optimal monetary policy combined with banking rigidities switches the sign
of the output response from positive to negative. The mild and short recession observed is the consequence
of the countercyclical and strong reaction of the central bank to the external finance premium. As the
beneficial financial shock reduces the external finance premium, the central bank sets a higher nominal
interest rate which has a negative impact on aggregate demand through lower consumption and investment
spending. In the model with unit banking elasticity (baseline), the central bank does not react actively to
changes in the countercyclical external finance premium and the financial shock results in some economic
expansion due to lower borrowing costs that stimulate demand and reduce the marginal costs of production.
The welfare effects of financial shocks are also amplified by banking rigidities. Both consumption and
leisure report much larger reactions when banking rigidities are high (see Figure 3). In Table 4, we report
that the welfare level is around 25 times higher than when the optimal monetary policy is conducted
with unit banking elasticity. The welfare effects under different banking technologies are even greater if a
Taylor rule is implemented by the central bank (the difference is captured by a factor of more than 80).
Such differences can be also noticed in the standard deviations of either consumption and leisure as direct
determinants of household welfare.
The Taylor rule also shows a much poorer performance when banking rigidities are in place. The lack of
a straight response to the exogenous change in the external finance premium leads to a strong activation of
the financial accelerator mechanism. The interest rate of loans falls and the economy expands both on the
demand side (higher consumption and investment spending) and on the supply side (lower real marginal
cost). The fall of the interest rate of loans is much deeper with banking rigidities (−3.6% annualized
versus −0.4% annualized in the baseline model), which is transmitted to severe differences observed in the
aggregate demand of the goods market and the rate of unemployment of the labor market.
5 Conclusions
This paper describes a dynamic model where both firms and households must borrow from banks to
cover their expenditure plans. Banks provide financial services combining collateral and monitoring labor
to produce loans. The introduction of external finance makes the cost of borrowing be one additional
component of the structural equations for consumption, the stock of capital, the labor supply and the
marginal cost of production. In the banking sector, the interest rate of loans is obtained as the sum of
the interest rate of deposits plus the marginal cost of loan production. The use of firm equity as collateral
in the production of loans brings a financial accelerator mechanism for the propagation of business cycle
fluctuations.
We have calibrated the model for policy simulations under alternative settings of the loan production
technology and different sources of shocks. In the baseline calibration based on US data during the Great
Moderation period, there is a unit elasticity of substitution between collateral and labor in loan production,
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and technology, inflation and financial shocks simultaneously generate business cycle fluctuations.
The optimal monetary policy has been derived as a social planner’s program that maximizes household
welfare. Since consumption and leisure are the arguments of the utility function, the second-order approx-
imation to intertemporal utility implies that the optimal rule should be targeting the volatilities of both
consumption and leisure. In addition, we have designed an optimized instrument rule that provides simple
responses of the interest rate to observable variables such as the rate of inflation, the rate of unemploy-
ment and the external finance premium, in a way fully implementable by modern central banks. These
response coefficients have been estimated by making multiple simulations of the optimal policy constrained
to the setting of the instrument rule. For testing conventional monetary policy, a Taylor rule has also
been examined. The optimal rule leads the economy towards a flexible-price scenario: the real effects of
technology shocks are amplified whereas the inflation shocks are basically neutralized with no significant
real effects for output, consumption and unemployment. This opens a trade-off between stabilizing the
goods market (Taylor rule) and the labor market (optimal rule), but it does not require any central-bank
significant reaction to changes in the external finance premium. The optimized reactions of the nominal
interest rate are quantitatively moderate to inflation deviations (0.59) and to the rate of unemployment
(-0.10). In terms of policy performance, the optimized instrument rule provides a good approximation to
the targeting rule and improves substantially the stabilizing capacity of the Taylor rule (the level of social
welfare with the optimized rule almost improves by 50% the one obtained with the Taylor rule). Most of
the welfare loss is explained by the effects of the inflation shock, which results in an economic recession
under the Taylor rule that could have been neutralized by implementing the optimal policy.
With a low banking elasticity (0.1), the level of welfare drops by nearly 37% under the optimal rule,
justified by a higher volatility of leisure time caused by banking rigidities and the financial accelerator. The
optimized instrument rule requires reactions of negative sign to changes in the external finance premium (-
0.16) that were not required with a unit banking elasticity. The welfare loss of implementing a conventional
Taylor rule is also significantly larger than in the baseline case.
Finally, when financial shocks drive the business cycles, the conventional Taylor rule would perform
significantly worse than the optimal rule with higher variability in the labor market. The optimal policy
in a financial business cycle requires stronger response coefficients of the nominal interest rate to changes
in inflation (1.57), unemployment (-0.34) and the external finance premium (-0.26). The worst case for the
stabilizing performance of a Taylor rule is a financial business cycle with banking rigidities, because the
volatilities of consumption and leisure soar while social welfare plummets.
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Appendix
1. Household optimal consumption allocation
For a given desired level of consumption bundles, ct, the representative household chooses the amount
of consumption of the differentiated good ω by solving the following maximization problem:
Max
ct(ω)
 1
0
ct(ω)
θp−1
θp dω
 θp
θp−1
s.to : ct =
 1
0
Pt(ω)
Pt
ct(ω)dω
where the aggregate price level is obtained from the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation scheme
Pt =
 1
0
Pt(ω)
1+θpdω
 1
1+θp
First order conditions of this problem give the following demand curve21
ct(ω)
ct
=

Pt(ω)
Pt
	−θp
where θp > 1 is the Dixit-Stiglitz constant elasticity of substitution.
2. Household optimal labor supply allocation.
The aggregate labor supply to firms is a CES composite of heterogeneous labor services
nst =
 1
0
nst (ω)
1+θw
θw dω
 θw
1+θw
while the aggregate nominal wage is also obtained with a CES aggregation scheme
Wt =
 1
0
Wt(ω)
1+θwdω
 1
1+θw
The optimal allocation of labor supply across firms is determined by solving the problem
Max
nst (ω)
 1
0
Wt(ω)n
s
t (ω)dω
s.to : nst =
 1
0
nst (ω)
1+θw
θw dω
 θw
1+θw
The first order condition yields
Wt(ω)− κt (n
s
t )
− 1
θw nst(ω)
1
θw = 0
where κt is the Lagrangian multiplier. The optimal relative labor supply becomes
nst(ω)
nst
=

Wt(ω)
κt
	θw
21Proof available in Walsh (2010), pages 331-332.
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As a standard result in monopolistically competitive markets, the Lagrange multiplier κt coincides with the
aggregate price index. In this case, the price index is the nominal wage. Inserting nst (ω) =

Wt(ω)
κt
θw
nst
in the CES labor supply bundle gives
nst =
 1
0

Wt(ω)
κt
	θw
nst
 1+θwθw
dω

θw
1+θw
=
nst
κ
θw
t
 1
0

Wt(ω)
θw
 1+θwθw
dω
 θw1+θw
which can be solved for κt as follows
κt =
 1
0
Wt(ω)
1+θwdω
 1
1+θw
≡Wt
Replacing κt with Wt in the optimal relative supply equation, it is obtained
nst(ω)
nst
=

Wt(ω)
Wt
	θw
3. Log-linearized equation for aggregate firm earnings
The real earnings and the real marginal cost for the representative ω firm are, respectively,
et(ω) =
Pt(ω)
Pt
yt(ω)−

1 + τfr
l
t
Wt(ω)
Pt
nt(ω) + r
k
t kt(ω)
	
and
ξt(ω) =

1 + τfr
l
t
 Wt(ω)
Pt
nt(ω)
(1− α) yt(ω)
=

1 + τfr
l
t

rkt kt(ω)
αyt(ω)
Inserting the expressions for ξt(ω) into the earnings equation results in
et(ω) =
Pt(ω)
Pt
yt(ω)− ξt(ω) (1− α) yt(ω)− ξt(ω)αyt(ω) =
Pt(ω)
Pt
yt(ω)− ξt(ω)yt(ω)
Real earnings per output for firm ω yield
et(ω)
yt(ω)
=

Pt(ω)
Pt
− ξt(ω)
	
which in loglinear terms can be approximated as follows
et(ω)− yt(ω) = µ
µ− 1
 Pt(ω)− Pt− 1
µ− 1
ξt(ω)
where µ =
θp

1+
1−α
α+θw

θp−1
is the steady-state mark-up. The aggregation across all firms et =  10 et(ω)dω leads
to et = − 1
µ− 1
ξt + yt
4. Definition of equilibrium
Given the stochastic shocks for technology, price indexation, and collateral in loan production, a recur-
sive imperfectly competitive equilibrium is a sequence of prices {rdt , r
l
t, csyt, Pt(ω),Wt(ω)}, with ω ∈ [0, 1],
such that agents behave optimally and markets are in equilibrium.
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The goods market equilibrium requires the aggregate supply be equal to the aggregate demand
1
Pt
 1
0
Pt(ω)y
s
t (ω)dω =

1 + τhr
l
t
 1
0
ct(ω)
θp−1
θp dω
 θp
θp−1
+

1 + τhr
l
t

I

kt+1
kt
	
kt+(xt+1−xt)vt+(dt+1 − dt)
In the banking sector, the amount of real loans is lt = dtB[a

eε
l
tvt
χ
+ (1− a)mχt ]
1
χ , which must be equal
to firms and households total demand for real loans, as given by
dtB[a

eε
l
tvt
χ
+ (1− a)mχt ]
1
χ =
 1
0
lft (ω)dω + l
h
t
where lft (ω) = τf

Wt(ω)
Pt
nt(ω) + r
k
t kt(ω)

and lht = τh

ct + I

kt+1
kt

kt

.
For equilibrium in the deposit market, the households’ aggregate demand for real deposits should be
equal to the banks’ aggregate supply of real deposits. The real amount of loans in the bank’s balance sheet
is equal to the supply of real deposits (abstracting from bank reserves). In turn, the equilibrium condition
becomes
dt = lt
In the equity market, demand and supply of shares must be equal, which entails
xt+1 = 1
In the market for labor at firms, aggregate supply and demand are, respectively,
nst =
 1
0
nst (ω)
1+θw
θw dω
 θw
1+θw
and nt =
 1
0
nt(ω)dω
while the aggregate rate of equilibrium unemployment is
ut = 1−
nst
nt
In the market for labor services at banks, the amount of labor supplied by households is equal to the
amount of labor demanded by banks
mst = mt
Finally, the capital goods rental market is in equilibrium when the total supply of the households is equal
to the total demand by the firms
kt =
 1
0
kt(ω)dω
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5. Set of steady-state relationships
rl = rd +
wm
l
avχ + (1− a)mχ
(1− a)mχ
csy = w
a
(1− a)
m
v
1−χ
v =
e
ρ− csy
rd = ρ
e = (1− ξ) y
ξ = α−α (1− α)−(1−α)

1 + τfr
l

(w)1−α

rk
α
ξ =
θp − 1
θp(1 +
1−α
α+θw
)
l = d
l = τh (c+ δk) + τf

wn+ rkk

l = dB[avχ + (1− a)mχ]
1
χ
w = Ψ(1− n−m)−γ cσ

1 + τhr
l

y = kαn1−α
k = n

ξα
(1 + τfrl) rk
	1/(1−α)
rk = ρ+ δ
y =

1 + τhr
l

(c+ δk)
u = 0
Sixteen non-linear equations may provide solutions for the sixteen endogenous variables: y, c, n, k, v,
e, w, u, l, d, rk, rl, rd, csy, ξ and m.
6. Set of log-linear dynamic equations with an interest-rate (instrument) monetary policy rule
Consumption equation
ct = Etct+1 − 1
σ

rdt − ρ

−
τh
σ

rlt −Etr
l
t+1

(A1)
New Keynesian Phillips curve
πt − π = βEt (πt+1 − π) +
(1−η)(1−βη)
η

1+
θp(1−α)
α+θw
 ξt − (1−α)α+θw ut+ 1− βρp εpt (A2)
Rate of unemployment as excess supply of labor
ut = nst − nt (A3)
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Overall resources constraint (goods market-clearing condition)
yt = (1+τhrl)cy ct + (1+τhrl)δky it + τh rlt − rl (A4)
Capital accumulation equation
kt+1 = 11+βkt + β1+βEtkt+2 + 1(1+β)ǫ Etrkt+1 − rk− rdt − ρ− τh rlt −Etrlt+1 (A5)
Optimal allocation for capital and labor demand
1
rk

rkt − r
k

− wt = kt − nt (A6)
Real interest rate of loans
rlt − r
l =

rdt−1 − ρ

−Et−1 (πt − π) + (r
l − ρ)
wmt − lt −Ω(χ− 1)mt − vt − εlt (A7)
Total demand for real loans
lt = τfwnl (wt + nt) + τfrkkl  1rk rkt − rk+ kt+ τhcl ct + τhδkl it (A8)
Loan production technology in credit market equilibrium (dt = lt)
0 = Ωεlt +Ωvt + (1−Ω) mt (A9)
Real wage dynamics wt = wt−1 + πwt − πt (A10)
Wage inflation equation
πwt − π
w = βEt

πwt+1 − π
w

− (1−η)(1−βη)η(α+θw+θp(1−α))

ut + θpξt (A11)
Portfolio choice for equity investment
vt = 11+ρEtvt+1 + 11+ρEt (csyt+1 − csy) + ρ−csy1+ρ Etet+1 − rdt − ρ (A12)
Aggregate firm earnings et = − ξ1−ξξt + yt (A13)
Collateral service yield of equity from banks optimizing program
csyt − csy = csy
wmt + (χ− 1) (vt − mt) + χεlt (A14)
Leisure time leist = − n+m1−n−m elt (A15)
Real marginal cost ξt = τfrlt + (1− α) wt + αrk rkt − rk− εzt (A16)
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Total effective labor (at both firms and banks)
elt = nn+mnt + mn+m mt (A17)
Cobb Douglas production technology
yt = εzt + αkt + (1− α)nt (A18)
Investment it = 1δkt+1 − (1−δ)δ kt (A19)
Labor supply curve
n
1−n−mnst + m1−n−m mt = 1γ  wt − ut − σct − τh rlt − rl (A20)
Banking labor supply curve
n
1−n−mnst + m1−n−m mt = 1γ wmt − σct − τh rlt − rl (A21)
Fisher relation for deposits
rdt = Rt −Etπ
p
t+1 (A22)
External finance premium
efpt − efp =

rlt − r
l

−

rdt−1 − ρ

− (csy)(v)l
vt + 1csy (csyt − csy)− lt (A23)
Monetary policy rule
Rt −R =
#
µπ (πt − π) + µuut + µefp (efpt − efp)
$
+ εRt (A24)
Endogenous variables (24): πwt , πt, r
k
t , r
l
t, r
d
t , Rt, csyt, yt, kt+1, nt, nst , ut, ct, it, wt, wmt , ξt, et, vt, lt, mt,elt, leist and efpt.
Exogenous variables (4): AR(1) processes determine the evolution of the technology shock, εzt , the
financial shock, εlt, the monetary policy (interest-rate) shock, ε
R
t , and the price indexation (inflation)
shock, εpt .
7. The central-bank Ramsey problem
In order to have a simpler set of relations in the competitive equilibrium, let us introduce one additional
variable: total effective labor, elt = nt +mt. The bank choose prices and quantities of the variables of
the competitive equilibrium in order to maximize intertemporal household utility. The list of endogenous
variables includes ct, Rt−R, wt, rkt −rk, ut, rlt−rl, elt, kt+1, mt, πt, πwt , vt, et, lt, csyt−csy, and leist. We
have used the definition of elt and equations (A16)-(A22) to insert in the rest of the system the following
seven relations ξt = τfrlt + (1− α) wt + αrk rkt − rk− εzt
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nt = n+mn elt − mn mt
yt = εzt + αkt + (1− α)ntit = 1δkt+1 − (1−δ)δ kt
nst = 1γ 1−n−mn  wt − ut − σct − τh rlt − rl− mn mt
wmt = wt − ut
rdt = Rt −Etπ
p
t+1
so that we can drop the seven equations (A16)-(A22) and the seven variables ξt, nt, yt,it, nst , wmt , and rdt
from the set of endogenous variables. This allows us to have a competitive equilibrium characterized by
the set of equations from (A1) to (A15).22
As described in Woodford (2003), we take the second-order approximation to the instantaneous utility
function specification to obtain
c1−σt
1− σ
+Ψ
(1− nst −m
s
t )
1−γ
1− γ
≃
c1−σ
1− σ
+ c1−σ
ct − (σ − 1)
2
c2t	+Ψ leis1−γ1− γ +Ψls1−γ
leist − (γ − 1)
2
leis2t	
which brings the intertemporal welfare function
Wt = Et
∞

j=0
βj

c1−σ
ct+j − (σ − 1)
2
c2t+j	+Ψls1−γ leist+j − (γ − 1)2 leis2t+j
		
whereas the equations describing the dynamics of the model are those that belong to the simplified system
(A1)-(A15) in period t and in any other previous or future periods.
The optimal control solution consists of the following 16 first order conditions23
c1−σ(1− σ)ct − λ1,t + β−1λ1,t−1 − (1−n−m)n σγ λ3,t − c(1+τhrl)y λ4,t − cτhl λ8,t − c(1+τhrl)y λ13,t = 0 (ct)
− 1σ
λ1,t + 1(1+β)ǫλ5,t + βEtλ7,t+1 + λ12,t = 0 (Rt −R)
− φπ(1− α)λ2,t + 1−n−mn 1γλ3,t − λ6,t + (rl − rd)λ7,t − τfwnl λ8,t + λ10,t
− βEtλ10,t+1 + θπξ(1− α)λ11,t + ξ(1−α)1−ξ λ13,t − csyλ14,t = 0 (wt)
−φπα
rk
λ2,t − 1β(1+β)ǫλ5,t−1 + 1rk λ6,t − τfkl λ8,t + θπξαrk λ11,t + ξα(1−ξ)rk λ13,t = 0 (rkt − rk)
−n+mn
λ3,t + (1−α)(n+m)n λ4,t − n+mn λ6,t − τfw(n+m)l λ8,t − n+m1−n−mλ15,t = 0 (xt)
22Equation (A23) is the definition of the external finance premium, efpt, and equation (A24) is the instrument rule for
adjustments in the nominal interest rate, Rt. They both are dropped for the computation of the Ramsey-type optimal
monetary policy.
23These definitions were used for simplifying notation:
φπ =
(1−η)(1−βη)(α+θw)
η(α+θw+θp(1−α))
, φπu =
(1−η)(1−βη)(α+θw)
η(α+θw+θp(1−α))
(1−α)
(α+θw)
, θπ =
(1−η)(1−βη)
η(α+θw+θp(1−α))
, and θπξ =
(1−η)(1−βη)
η(α+θw+θp(1−α))
θp.
As assumed throughout the paper, variables with no time subscript refer to the steady-state value.
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− (1+τhr
l)i
yδ
λ4,t + β(α+ (1+τhrl)i(1−δ)yδ )Etλ4,t+1 + λ5,t − β1+βEtλ5,t+1 − 11+βλ5,t−1 + βEtλ6,t+1 − τhilδ λ8,t
−

τf r
kk
l −
τhi(1−δ)
lδ

βEtλ8,t+1 − (1+τhrl)iyδ λ13,t + (1+τhrl)i(1−δ)yδ βEtλ13,t+1 = 0 (kt+1)
− (1−α)mn
λ4,t + mn λ6,t + (rl − rd)(1−Ωχ)λ7,t + τfwml λ8,t − 1−ΩΩ λ9,t + csy(χ− 1)λ14,t = 0 ( wmt )
−(rl − rd)λ7,t + λ8,t = 0 (lt)
−λ10,t + λ11,t − λ11,t−1 = 0 (πwt − πw)
(rl − rd)Ωχλ7,t − λ9,t + λ12,t − λ12,t−1 − csy(χ− 1)λ14,t = 0 (vt)
−(rd − csy)λ12,t−1 + λ13,t = 0 (et)
− 1βσ
λ1,t−1 + λ2,t − λ2,t−1 − 1β(1+β)ǫλ5,t−1 − λ7,t + λ10,t − 1βλ12,t−1 = 0 (πt − π)
−λ12,t−1 + λ14,t = 0 (csyt − csy)
Ψleis1−γ(1− γ)leist − λ15,t = 0 (leist)
φπu
λ2,t − 1 + (1−m−n)n 1γλ3,t − (rl − rd)λ7,t + θπλ11,t + csyλ14,t = 0 (ut)
− τhσ
λ1,t + τhσβλ1,t−1 − φπτfλ2,t − (1−m−n)n τhγ λ3,t − τhλ4,t + τh(1+β)ǫλ5,t
− τh(1+β)ǫβ
λ5,t−1 − λ7,t + θπξτfλ11,t +  ξτf1−ξ − τh λ13,t = 0 (rlt − rl)
where λi,t+j = λi,t+j−λi, is the difference between the Lagrange multiplier of the equation (Ai) written for
period t+ j and its corresponding value in the steady state. The targeting rule also includes the following
15 competitive equilibrium constraints (which are equivalent to the set from A1 to A15)
−ct +Etct+t − 1
σ
((Rt −R)−Et (πt+1 − π))−
τh
σ (r
l
t −Etr
l
t+1) = 0 (λ1,t)
(πt − π)− βEt (πt+1 − π)− φπξt + φπuut − 1− βρp εpt = 0 (λ2,t)
(1−m−n)
n
1
γ ( wt − σct − τh(rlt − rl))− n+mn elt − 1 + 1−n−mn 1γut = 0 (λ3,t)
εat + α
kt + (1− α)(n+mn elt − mn mt)− (1+τhrl)y cct + iδ (kt+1 − (1− δ)kt)
	
− τh(r
l
t − r
l) = 0 (λ4,t)
kt+1 + 11+βkt − β1+βEtkt+2 − 1(1+β)ǫEt(rkt+1 − rk)− (Rt −R) +Et (πt+1 − π)− τh(rlt −Etrlt+1) = 0 (λ5,t)
1
rk
(rkt − r
k)− wt − n+mn elt + mn mt + kt = 0 (λ6,t)
(Rt−1 −R)−Et−1 (πt − π) + (r
l − rd)(wt − ut − lt +Ωχ(εlt + vt) + (1−Ωχ)mt)− (rlt − rl) = 0 (λ7,t)lt− τfwnl wt + n+mn elt − mn mt− τf rkkl  1rk rkt − rk+ kt− τhl cct − iδ−1(kt+1 − (1− δ)kt) = 0 (λ8,t)
−εlt −
1−Ω
Ω mt − vt = 0 (λ9,t)
wt − wt−1 − (πwt − πw) + (πt − π) = 0 (λ10,t)
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(πwt − π
w)− βEt

πwt+1 − π
w

+ θπut + θπξ((1− α) wt + αrk (rkt − rk) + τf (rlt − rl)− εat ) = 0 (λ11,t)
vt − βEtvt+1 − βEt(csyt+1 − csy)− β(ρ− csy)Etet+1 + (Rt −R)−Et (πt+1 − π) = 0 (λ12,t)
et + ξ1−ξ τf (rlt − rl) + (1− α) wt + αrk (rkt − rk)− εat
− (1+τhr
l)
y

cct − i
δ
(kt+1 − (1− δ)kt	− τh(rlt − rl) = 0 (λ13,t)
(csyt − csy)− csy(wt − ut + (χ− 1)(vt − mt)− χεlt) = 0 (λ14,t)
−leist − n+m1−n−m elt = 0 (λ15,t)
The targeting rule comprises a total of 31 equations which may determine solution paths for 31 en-
dogenous variables (16 of them are the choice variables and the remaining 15 variables are the Lagrange
multipliers). If the central bank decides to implement the monetary policy through adjustments in the
nominal interest, the solution path on the nominal interest could be written responding to 5 predetermined
variables (λ1,t−1, λ2,t−1, λ5,t−1, λ11,t−1, λ12,t−1) and 3 shocks (εat , εlt, εpt ).
41
